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A BSTRACT
Teaching nursing students to be safe in practice is a key element to any nursing curriculum. This article will discuss the use of a
Root Cause Analysis (RCO) framework with prelicensure nursing students, by the Quality and Safety Officer (QSO) in a School
of Nursing and Health Professions, as a method to enhance transparency and improve patient safety. The aim is to provide a
rationale for using this strategy, to identify the steps of a root cause analysis, to disclose barriers to its successful use, and to
explore dissemination to the partnering healthcare environments.
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1. I NTRODUCTION
Nurse educators have worked for more than a decade to address safety issues identified by the Institute of Medicine.[1]
Quality and safety edicts have been driving educational plans
and influencing the experiences provided for nursing students in hopes of producing a safe, competent nurse.[2, 3] The
American Association of Colleges of Nursing’s Essentials
of Baccalaureate Education for Professional Nursing Practice clearly states that the baccalaureate graduate must be
prepared to promote safe, high quality patient care in a variety of healthcare settings.[4] However, despite innumerable
attempts to improve safety in the healthcare arena, errors continue to plague patients and providers.[5] We have made little
progress in improving the landscape; worldwide reports have
stated that one in ten patients will experience an adverse incident including the leading risk of medical errors.[6] For more
than a decade, the adverse safety rate remains the same.[7]
This leaves the nurse educator with a difficult challenge. How
can we create an environment that allows students the latitude to learn; yet provides sufficient checks and balances
∗ Correspondence:

in a healthcare setting that remains unpredictable and potentially unsafe? Improving our prelicensure nursing students’
rate of error reporting while encouraging transparency is one
possible avenue.[8]
Transparency is a process that encourages members to share
the truth without blame.[9] The culture of transparency in
healthcare gives the opportunity for providers, including
nurses and nursing students, to increase their awareness of
quality and safety issues in the healthcare setting. By increasing one’s awareness through transparency, providers have
full disclosure of the issues involving medical errors and can
develop safer systems in response.[10] Medical errors are
events that affect the patient, which may fall into multiple
categories. Two examples of possible categories are: plan of
care not completed, tasks not executed correctly.[11]
1.1 Background
The quality and safety officer (QSO) is a formal role created to enhance safety and transparency in a school of nurs-
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ing and health professions in response to the call made by
the Quality and Safety Education for Nurses (QSEN) initiative.[12] QSEN’s main mission supports the prelicensure
student professional identity formation by encouraging faculty to include the knowledge, skills, and attitudes for six
competencies: safety; informatics; teamwork and collaboration; quality improvement; evidence-based practice; and
patient-centered care in the curriculum.[13] The QSO role
established at a private urban university has been successful
in moving the School of Nursing and Health Professions
toward a culture of safety reporting. Specifically, the QSO
instituted a reporting system, using the root cause analysis
framework. This initiative was developed to highlight the
safety competency identified by QSEN and to facilitate a
safety-reporting change in the School of Nursing and Health
Professions.
Convening formal “Root Cause Analysis (RCA)” meetings
to discuss medical errors sounds like a logical initial step.
However, without first creating a culture in which this action
feels constructive, such a gathering may feel punitive to the
nursing student and instructor. Fear of retribution, failing
a course, being removed from the nursing program and/or
simple embarrassment are just a few of the reasons it is difficult for a nursing student to report an error.[14, 15] Adopting
the use of a RCA framework within a culture of blame-free
environment is one method nurse educators can use to create
a constructive reporting environment.[16]
Health care environments have been notorious for dealing
with errors by assigning blame.[15] It is clear from the current error rate, the blame culture is not working. Instead,
we can follow in the footsteps of other high-risk arenas like
the automobile and aviation industries where the RCA was
originally used to uncover systems problems.[7] Utilizing the
RCA systematic framework, which is defined as a systematic framework to facilitate open communication about an
error,[14] one can determine the cause of error.[17] This is a
process that encourages and allows all members involved in
the error to discuss the event in a blame-free environment.
The systematic approach searches for the what, when, why related to the error and then helps to develop recommendations
that will prevent reoccurrences.
The process includes a formal error and near miss reporting system that dictates the use of a reporting tool to be
used in addition to the reporting systems used in each partnering healthcare institution.[12] The nursing student and
nursing instructor report errors to the QSO. The QSO uses
the RCA framework to provide a formal method of inquiry.
The QSO reports back to the entire faculty and student body
every semester to close the loop and perpetuate the cycle to
decrease error rates over time.
24
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1.2 Safety reporting process
We know that nurses, and nursing students under-report error.[15] To enhance reporting, a culture of transparency and
constructive analysis needed to be fostered. First steps included the introduction of a formal error reporting system
developed and managed by the QSO. The policy is clearly
outlined in each clinical syllabus, student handbook, faculty
handbook, and the online learning management platforms
accessible to both faculty and students. Students and faculty
are instructed that this report must be completed in addition
to any incident reports required by the health care unit.
When an error occurs in a clinical site, the student completes
the internal error form within 48 hours. Incidents such as
medication omission, wrong dose, patient fall, or needle stick
are just a few examples. The QSO receives the error forms
and over the course of the semester, analyzes the data looking
for patterns. These patterns have included: not completing
the entire patient rights protocol when administering medication; recapping needles; or discovering medicines in the
wrong patient cassettes or bins. Uncovering these types of
patterns is helpful as they are discussed at faculty meetings
to put instructors on high alert and to ask classroom teachers
to reiterate protocols. Along with examining patterns of errors, which help to identify gaps in our educational plan or
system structures, the QSO conducts a root cause analysis in
order to provide a safe environment in which to discuss each
untoward event.

2. ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
The root cause analysis framework is used to identify the underlying reasons an error was made and to then move forward
with recommendations to reduce the risk of recurrence.[18]
The goal is to provide an environment that is blame-free but
safe enough to encourage taking responsibility for the error.
It is important to use a systematic approach to ensure a fair
and just process.
2.1 RCA framework
2.1.1 Identification of RCA participants
It is important to include the appropriate participants in the
RCA to ensure that all sides are represented. Participants
include: the nursing student, clinical instructor, RN working
with student, unit manager, and the chair of the academic
department. The crucial participants are the student and instructor and at a minimum these two people must be present
to hold the RCA. The nurse working with the student and
the unit manager also are invited. Extending this invitation
solidifies how serious the university takes this event and also
demonstrates our desire to work together.
ISSN 1925-4040
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Table 1. Root cause analysis framework
Steps

Title

Description

I

Inviting Participants

QSO receives and evaluates error form. Invites participants.

II

Environment

QSO sets up appropriate meeting environment.

III

Discussion

QSO facilitates blame-free discussion.

IV

Conclusion

QSO summarizes findings.

2.1.2 Facilitating the RCA
The RCA process can be nerve-wracking for the participants,
especially for the student who made the error. Usually this
is a first time event for all, making the participants anxious
about the process. It is the QSO’s job to make sure the
process goes smoothly. This includes making sure the participants understand the process: ensuring that process rules
are understood and followed.

Step IV: Conclusion Once the factors have been identified,
it is the QSO’s responsibility to summarize what has been
presented. Restating what could have been done to avoid
error is important. Coming to a conclusion with all participants as to the cause is important in order to have closure
of this event. Not blaming the individual is key. Causes can
be categorized to help guide a recommendation. Categories
could include: system problem; environmental issue; knowledge deficient; communication factor; documentation factor;
skill deficient; or human factors such as a lapse in memory.

2.1.3 Process sequence
Step I: Inviting Participants Once the error has been identified and reviewed by the QSO, the participants are invited Having the student re-state ways to avoid the error is important. It is also helpful to discuss factors that contributed
to the RCA.
to the issue. Concluding with a plan for the student that is
Step II: Setting up the Environment Setting up the envisimple and clear is the goal. The hope is that the outcome
ronment for the meeting is important to success. The QSO
of the RCA includes the student returning to their original
is willing to conduct the RCA at the healthcare setting or
clinical site with a specific plan that encourages a feeling of
at the university depending on the needs of the participants.
confidence. The clinical plan may include: instructions on
Ideally, the QSO secures a conference room that is private,
what type of patient to care for, when to call the instructor,
quiet, and offers an inclusive feel. A round or oval table
and what specifically to study before arriving at the clinical
with comfortable chairs provides an equal setting for all the
site.
participants.
Step III: Discussion The QSO begins the meeting with introductions and an explanation of the RCA process. All
members are assured that the intent of the meeting is to create an open and fair dialogue to determine the etiology of
an error. The QSO will manage the flow of the questions in
order to ensure that each member is heard. The questions are
focused on getting to the crux of the error and identifying all
factors that played a role in the event. Patient identifiers are
not included in the University driven reporting tool.

2.2 Case studies
Several case studies are presented to illustrate the RCA process. The case studies provide a descriptive scenario of the
interactions of the RCA members. The sample case studies will help to familiarize readers with the RCA process.
The cases are composites of several similar events and are
presented only as instructional models.

2.2.1 Medication error
The student is the first to reflect. Questions asked by the The QSO received an error report from a senior-level nursing
QSO are:
student that the incorrect dose of a medication was administered.
(1) Will you please tell us what happened?
(2) What should have happened or what should you have Step I: The QSO read the report and invited participants to
done?
a RCA meeting. Potential attendees included the student,
(3) What was the main cause?
instructor, RN working with the student, nurse manager, and
(4) Do you feel you are safe in clinical?
Chair of the Bachelor’s in Nursing Department. The student,
instructor, and Chair participated. The manager and RN
During each response the QSO may ask follow-up questions
declined the invitation.
to clarify. Next, the clinical faculty is asked to add any additional pertinent information. Then the same is asked of the Step II: The QSO obtained a quiet conference room with an
RN, nurse manager, and Chair of the academic department. oval table and comfortable chairs.
Published by Sciedu Press
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Step III: The QSO facilitated the meeting. The session
started with the QSO introducing the format of the RCA plus
the intent of the meeting, which was to encourage open and
fair dialogue. The student was first asked to “Please tell us
what happened.”
I was working with a nurse and had two patients
to care for pretty much by myself. My nurse and
I were to give our 9 am medications. I thought I
was to give 200 mg of thiamine IV. That is what
I saw on the medication record so I drew up the
2 ml of medication in a syringe. Then I drew up
oral medications, crushed them, and put them in
applesauce to give to the patient. I went into the
patient’s room and administered the thiamine.
Next, I went to the bar code to scan the medication. At that time, I noticed I was to give 100
mg of thiamine and not 200 mg. I had misread
the amount in the medication room.

2015, Vol. 5, No. 7

student and RN preceptor were too casual with
each other. I worried that the guidance was less
because of this casual feeling. I talked to the
student about this in the past. The student and
RN should have looked at the computer together,
to ensure the correct dose was prepared.
Step IV: Inexperience and not following the procedure led
to this error. Why the student saw 200 mg in the medication
room was not clear. Lapse in memory does not seem to be
the cause. The student read the record incorrectly but why
is still unknown. The student appeared to have learned from
this incident and both the instructor and student felt that the
student was safe to return to the clinical setting. The student
stated that they would discuss feeling too comfortable with
the RN preceptor to ensure proper guidance. The student
left the meeting with a sense of confidence and returned to
clinical.

2.2.2 Scope of practice error
The QSO was called by a nursing instructor and informed
What should you have done? I should have scanned the
that a junior student had disconnected a central line on a
medication first.
patient independently. The error form was sent to the QSO.
Please tell me how the bar coding system works:
Step I: The QSO read the report and set the RCA framework
into action. Participants were invited to the RCA. This
The computer has the medication record for
included the student, instructor, RN working with student,
each patient on it. You bring it to the pyxsis
manager, and chair of department. The student, instructor,
where the medications are stored. You remove
chair of department, and manager of unit participated in
the correct medications from the pyxsis using
RCA.
the computer’s medical record. Then you bring
the computer into the patient’s room, complete
Step II: The QSO offered to facilitate the meeting in the
the patient’s rights, scan the medication, give
healthcare setting if the manager wished. However, the manthe medication, and then chart the medication.
ager preferred to come to the university setting. A private,
So what happened in this case?
I did not follow the procedure. I did complete
the patient rights but I did not continue with the
process. I gave the medication before I scanned
it. If I had scanned it I would have seen that I
was to give 100 mg and not 200 mg. I skipped
a step. When I first drew up the medication, I
saw 200 mg. I have no answer as to why that
happened.
The QSO now asked the clinical faculty if they have anything
to add:
The student explained the incident correctly.
The policy was not followed and that led to this
error. The student did tell the RN right away
and called me to let me know. The one other
factor that I have witnessed is that I believed the
26

quiet conference room with an oval table and comfortable
chairs was obtained.
Step III: The QSO facilitated the meeting. The session
started with the QSO introducing the format of the RCA plus
the intent of the meeting, which was to encourage open and
fair dialogue. The student was first asked to please tell us
what happened.
I was working with my RN to care for one patient on an oncology unit. The patient had a
double lumen central line. One port had normal
saline at 30 cc/hour infusing and the other line
was clamped. I was alone in the room with my
patient when the doctor came in and said the
patient needed to go to x-ray right away and to
“discontinue the normal saline”. Then, the transport person came in and said the patient had
to go right away and told me to get the patient
ready. He asked if I could disconnect the line. I
ISSN 1925-4040
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went outside to the hall and could not find my
nurse. The doctor came back and said “hurry up
and get his patient down to x-ray”. The doctor
seemed angry, so I disconnected the central line
and put a cap on the line.

line. I am not happy to hear that the doctor was
pushing you that way. It is good to discuss this
so that I can bring this back so that you will
not have this happen again. Also, I will talk to
my staff and the transport staff about students’
scope of practice.

How did you cap the line? I just disconnected the fluid line
and put a blue cap on the end of the central line.

I am so relieved to know that the university takes
these events seriously and has a protocol to follow. I feel so much better being a part of this
discussion.

Did you put anything in the line like heparin or saline? No, I
just capped the line and they took the patient to x-ray.
Then what happened?
They took the patient to x-ray. Then I went and
found my nurse. I told her what happened and
what I had done to the line. She was not happy.
She explained that the line needed to be flushed
with heparin. She told the manager what happened and went to x-ray to fix the line. I called
my instructor.
What should have happened?
I should have stopped and found my nurse or
instructor to help me. I knew it was wrong to
disconnect the line but I felt so much pressure
from the doctor. I wish I would have just said
no but I wanted to make everyone happy.
The QSO asked the instructor if they had anything to add:
The account was correct. The one thing I would
add is that there was a family member in the
room who was also pushing for the student to
disconnect the line. Everyone just wanted the
x-ray completed. When this was happening, I
was on another floor with a different student so
I did not know this student needed help. The
student did call me and knew right away that
this was outside of the scope of practice. The
student has always been well prepared and acted
appropriately. This is a first time event.
The QSO asked the manager to respond:
I was very unhappy to hear that a nursing student acted out of their scope of practice. My
patients are very sick and disconnecting a line
can be devastating. The student and instructor
did show appropriate concern and sorrow for
this event. I need to know that it will not happen
again. With that said, I did not know that you
had people pressuring you to disconnect this
Published by Sciedu Press

QSO asked the student: do you feel safe in clinical:
Yes, I do feel safe. If anything I am safer because I clearly know my scope of practice. I
will always call my nurse or instructor. This has
been so scary and I feel terrible this happened
but I will now be safe.
The instructor and manager agreed that the student would be
safe back in clinical. Additionally, both agreed they would
help any time if needed.
Step IV: Inexperience, inability to say no, wanting to please
people, and not understanding scope of practice all led to this
error. Wanting to please people of a perceived higher rank
was a human factor. Judgment error plays a role in this event.
The student, instructor and manager all felt that this student
could return to the clinical setting.
These two examples of RCA in action demonstrated the
power of talking about the event in detail. All members of
the analysis walked away with a better knowledge of the
factors that led to the error. Having the student felt heard
and believed was imperative. Providing a forum that allowed
the participants to speak freely, honestly, and blame-free was
truly a gift that educators offered.

3. D ISSEMINATING THE RCA FRAMEWORK
Utilizing the RCA framework in the academic setting proved
successful with the prelicensure nursing students. The above
case studies demonstrated the process. Can the process disseminate to other settings? The RCA framework provided by
the academic setting, the process for root cause analysis was
successfully piloted in an outpatient setting. To highlight its
use, a case scenario is offered.
Outpatient pediatric respiratory distress case study
A child in respiratory distress left a clinic waiting area to
travel by car to an emergency department. Although the
clinic had a policy dictating that these patients bypass registration and be taken directly into an examination room for
27

www.sciedu.ca/jnep

Journal of Nursing Education and Practice

initial treatment, it was not followed due to miscommunication. Clinic administrators suggested immediate punitive
action, but were encouraged to consider convening their first
root cause analysis. The supervising nurse practitioner served
in the QSO role at the outpatient clinic.
In order to facilitate open, constructive communication aimed
at quality improvement, a RCA was planned and facilitated
by the supervising nurse practitioner. Allowing staff to discuss the event in a blame-free environment was proposed
as a better strategy to find solutions to a breakdown in the
transport policy. Participating staff were reassured that the
discussion would revolve around potential contributing factors such as knowledge related to the patient’s condition or
lack of understanding of the policy. A diagram of human
error management using coaching was offered as a starting
point. Everyone was comfortable that after determining the
root cause, recommendations for improvement would be
discussed. The registration tech, medical assistant, nurse
practitioner, physician, and medical director all agreed.

2015, Vol. 5, No. 7

lution was assessment of the situation from all viewpoints,
education regarding potential rapid patient deterioration, and
role-playing likely scenarios. Punitive action was avoided
and safety for future patients was improved.

4. C ONCLUSION
Creating a culture of safety that allows nursing students
to learn is a difficult task for the nurse educator. Enhancing safety reporting may increase transparency and led to
improved patient safety. Developing the role of a Quality
and Safety Officer whose goal is to make changes involving
the safety culture at the School of Nursing and Health Professions is one method to help the nurse educator and the
nursing students. Utilizing the root cause analysis method is
one way that nurse educators can use to help facilitate open
communication about an error. This step-by-step process
leads to open communication, which fosters the creation of
solutions to medical errors instead of simply placing blame.
The case studies demonstrated the value of the RCA in an
academic setting with prelicensure nursing students and nursing instructors. Dissemination of the RCA process to the
outpatient setting highlighted its value in multiple settings
with an advanced practice nurse. Putting patient safety first
must be the goal of all healthcare providers. Helping our
nursing students learn early in their educational process about
safety reporting, blame free environments, and responsibility
may increase safety at the bedside.

Interesting dialogue resulted which provided new insight
from many angles. From the vantage point of the front desk,
questions arose about whether patients could be taken from
the waiting area without first providing basic demographic
information. From the medical assistant lens, concern about
summoning a nurse practitioner or physician into the waiting area surfaced. Both the nurse practitioner and physician
were unclear about how best to insist that the family bring
the child into an examination room when they preferred to C ONFLICTS OF I NTEREST D ISCLOSURE
go to an emergency department. So what seemed like a The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest statestraightforward policy, was not so simple after all. The so- ment.
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